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Negotiations over EU enlargement have highlighted difficulties in extending the CAP 
– and in particular direct payments - to the applicant countries, given the spending 
limits agreed in Berlin in 1999. This note presents estimates of direct payment costs in 
the Eastern European applicants. It argues that the only way all member states in an 
enlarged EU can receive the same level of payments is if the payments currently 
prevailing in the EU15 are reduced. 
 
                                                          
1 The work developing the model used in this paper (CAPCEE - The Cost of Agricultural Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe), was carried out in DEFRA (Economics International) during the summer 
of 2001. The author extends his thanks to all colleagues there (especially Jonathan, Iain and Paul) for 
their help and support and to DEFRA and HM Treasury for financial support through the Challenge 
Fund. All results and views presented are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as indicating 
UK government views or policy in any way. The author also thanks two anonymous referees for very 
helpful comments made on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies, of course. 
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1. Introduction 
The eastward enlargement of the EU is scheduled to begin in 2004.2 By mid 2002, 
serious negotiations on the terms of acceding to the CAP were only just beginning. A 
key concern is the amount of CAP spending the EU can afford to offer the new 
member states, given the tight spending limit agreed at Berlin covering the period 
2000-2006. Under the CAP there are three types of payment. Rural Development will 
not be discussed in detail here. It is noted simply that this is important for the future of 
agricultural and rural infrastructure in the applicant countries and thus needs to be 
made. Second there are payments related to price support. Since price support alters 
price levels, this needs to be extended to the new members to avoid different prices 
within the Single European Market. 
 
Third there are direct payments. Although long-available for some commodities, they 
have only been a core part of CAP support since 1992. Initially designed as specific 
compensation for a specific price cut, the 1999 reform saw this role change. The rise 
in direct payments was, however, less than the cut in price. The new policy of 
modulation, where countries can skim off a percentage of direct payments and recycle 
the money into rural development projects, has further reduced the link between 
payments and previous price levels.3 Direct payments therefore represent a shift in the 
basis of CAP support. This is crucial to the enlargement debate, because the issue is 
not compensation for price cuts the farmers in eastern Europe did not face, but about 
basic issues of support under the CAP. 
 
Given the importance of rural development and the characteristics of price support, 
the EU will be granting these policies and transfers. The focus is thus primarily on the 
level of direct payments that can be afforded. Applicants have sought parity with the 
EU15, whilst the EU has shifted from opposing granting any payments to phasing-in 
payments over 10 years, starting at 25% of EU15 levels.4 Direct payments can be 
offered at differentiated rates to different farmers and trade distortion can be avoided 
                                                          
2 Bulgaria and Romania will join later. 
3 The Commission intends this to continue. See European Commission 2002b. 
4 Ackrill 2000, pages 160-163, considers this debate in more detail. 
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if payments are decoupled.5 Whilst this challenges the notion of a common 
agricultural policy, this debate has been driven by the spending limit agreed at Berlin. 
This paper assesses the level of direct payments the EU can afford, given the Berlin 
spending limit and reasonable assumptions about rural development and price support 
costs. This complements other studies which estimate the cost of enlargement but do 
not consider explicitly the Berlin spending limit. 
 
2. The Model 
CAPCEE estimates the budget cost of applying the CAP in central and eastern 
European countries. Key values used in estimating direct payment costs (detailed in 
the Appendix) are determined endogenously using 1995-1999 data, the period 
originally requested by the Commission for data from the applicant countries. The 
estimates have been compared with the Commission ‘Issues Paper’ (European 
Commission 2002a) to ensure their appropriateness. The data in the Issues Paper were 
not used since this contains EU offers and applicant requests, but not final agreed 
values. Nor does it have data for Bulgaria and Romania. The estimates generated in 
CAPCEE do, however, fall within the range in the Issues Paper and therefore 
represent feasible outcomes from negotiation between the EU and applicants. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
The analysis assumes the accession of the CEE8 in 2004, with Bulgaria and Romania 
joining in 2008. Even if this is not exactly what happens, it allows the impact of a 
staggered accession to be shown. This is especially important for Romania, predicted 
to be a significant beneficiary from the CAP. Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated cost 
of direct payments by country and by main commodity. As expected, Poland is the 
largest beneficiary but Hungary and, later, Romania also receive significant sums. 
Sectoral spending is dominated by arable costs. Beef spending is extremely difficult 
to estimate given the lack of data identifying the numbers of animals eligible for 
support under this complex regime (see the Appendix for more details).6 
                                                          
5 Cahill (1997) suggests the 1992 arable payments were between 70% and 100% decoupled. 
6 Note that European Commission (2002a) does not contain cost estimates to use as a comparison. 
Silvis et al estimate higher beef costs and lower arable costs, but very similar costs overall. They base 
their calculations, however, on the narrower data period 1996-1998. 
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Table 1: Estimated Direct Payment Costs by Country (€ million) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bulgaria 595 
Czech Republic 630 652 674 697 696 
Estonia 60 65 71 76 76 
Hungary 1052 1069 1087 1104 1104 
Latvia 82 89 95 102 102 
Lithuania 242 258 274 290 289 
Poland 2152 2255 2358 2461 2461 
Romania 1717 
Slovakia 312 321 330 338 338 
Slovenia 59 64 69 74 74 
Total 4588 4773 4957 5142 7452 
 
Table 2: Estimated Direct Payment Costs by Principal Commodity (€ million) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 20081 
Arable 3980 3981 3981 3981 5761 
Dairy 186 371 557 605 
Beef 549 548 547 545 711 
Sheep 52 52 52 52 367 
Total2 4588 1773 4987 5142 7452 
Notes 
1 – CEE8 to 2007, CEE10 for 2008. 
2 – includes minor sums for olive oil, tobacco, ‘fibre plants’ and ‘other plants’. 
 
 
Table 3 focuses on the margin under the Berlin spending ceiling left for direct 
payments, once Rural Development and price support have been taken into account. 
Note that because the Berlin financial perspective only covers the period to 2006, 
some simple assumptions are made to extend the data through to 2008. Spending on 
Rural Development for 2004 to 2006 has been taken directly from the Issues Paper. 
The values for 2007 and 2008 are derived by a simple linear extrapolation of the 
previous three years’ Payment Appropriation figures. The Berlin spending ceiling for 
2004 to 2006 rises at a falling rate, so the estimates for 2007 and 2008 assume this 
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declining rate of increase continues. This implies no further adjustments are made to 
accommodate Bulgaria and Romania, a point returned to below. 
 
Table 3: CAP Transfers Affordable under the Berlin Agreement (€ million) 
Scenario  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Berlin Spending Ceiling 2450 2930 3400 3860 4310 
 Rural Development 748 1187 1730 2221 2712 
a (Price Support: CAPCEE) 468 532 586 480 479 
 Margin for Direct Payments 1234 1211 1084 1159 1119 
 Projected Direct Payments 4588 4773 4957 5142 7452 
 DP Affordable (%) 27 25 22 23 15 
b (Price Support: Issues Paper) 516 749 734   
 Margin for Direct Payments 1186 994 936   
 Projected Direct Payments 4588 4773 4957   
 DP Affordable (%) 26 21 19   
c Margin for Direct Payments 1234 1211 1084 1159 1119 
 Projected Direct Payments 4735 4920 5105 5292 7479 
 DP Affordable (%) 26 25 21 22 15 
Notes: 
See the text for the basis of the 2007 and 2008 extension of the Berlin spending 
ceiling, Rural Development spending and the basis for calculating the margin 
available for direct payments under each scenario. 
 
 
The first set of results (scenario ‘a’) has a margin for direct payments based on Rural 
Development spending as described above and price support costs taken from 
CAPCEE. The direct payment estimates also come from CAPCEE. These results are 
then compared with those from other studies, both to test the robustness of the 
CAPCEE estimates and, for price support costs, to act as a test of the sensitivity of the 
results given uncertainties over underlying assumptions of future world prices, 
dollar/euro exchange rates, etc. Scenario ‘b’ differs from ‘a’ by taking price support 
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estimates from the Issues Paper. Scenario ‘c’ differs from ‘a’ in its use of direct 
payment estimates taken from Silvis et al (2001).7 
 
We do not consider price support costs from any other study since, in particular, they 
do not include current cereals market conditions, where all grains except rye are 
exported without subsidy. Suffice it to say if estimates from other studies were 
included, the margin for direct payments would be reduced considerably.8 Nor do we 
repeat the exercise with direct payment estimates from the Issues Paper as this only 
offers estimates of phased direct payment costs, rather than full uncapped payments. 
 
Table 3 shows, first, that the estimates from CAPCEE are in line with those from 
other major studies. Second, all scenarios show that the EU cannot afford to offer the 
new member states the same level of direct payments as the EU15 given current 
payment levels, reasonable estimates of price support expenditure, expected Rural 
Development spending and the Berlin Summit spending ceiling. That is, this key 
conclusion is insensitive to the different cost estimates presented. 
 
Moreover, the Issues Paper proposes granting direct payments to new member states 
at 25% of EU15 values, rising by five percentage points per year until “the new 
Member States reach in 2013 the support level then applicable” (European 
Commission 2002a, page 6, emphasis added). Table 3 questions whether the EU will 
be able, ceteris paribus, even to raise direct payments above 25% of EU15 rates, 
under any scenario. For 2008 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the 
estimates in Table 3 assume no adjustment to Rural Development spending nor the 
spending ceiling. If we relax the second assumption, the spending ceiling would need 
to rise by about €745 million (or nearly 20%) just to permit payments to the CEE10 at 
25% of EU15 levels – and more if extra Rural Development resources are to be made 
available. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Adjusted to CEE8 for 2004-2007, CEE10 for 2008, based on their Table A2.2, page 59. 
8 For example, Silvis et al (2001) estimate ‘Market Expenditure’ at about €2 billion for the CEE8 and 
€2.7 billion for the CEE10. See also Swinnen (2002). 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has shown that the goal of granting all member states in an enlarged EU 
identical CAP direct payments will require further change to the policy – be it a rise in 
the spending limit or a reduction in the value of direct payments currently granted. It 
has also raised serious doubts over the ability of the EU currently to afford much 
more than 25% of current payment levels in the new member states. Moreover, both 
conclusions hold even when other studies’ estimates of future CAP spending are used. 
 
The earlier quote from the Issues Paper also implies change is required. What is of 
concern, however, is the ability of EU countries to agree a reduction in direct 
payments. In its ‘Mid-Term Review’ of the CAP (European Commission 2002b), the 
Commission proposed a wide-ranging set of reforms (although without any reduction 
in overall CAP spending). One measure is for the current modulation scheme to 
become compulsory, with direct payments reduced by 20%. Since modulation can 
involve redistribution between countries implying, in effect, uncompensated cuts in 
direct payments for some countries, significant opposition has already been voiced – a 
sign of the difficulties to come. Will it be the spending limit that is sacrificed for a 
successful enlargement or will reform be achieved that actually sees direct payments 
reduced? The talks on CAP reform and EU enlargement still have much to address. 
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Appendix – The Direct Payment Calculations 
All calculations are based as far as possible on the EU approach. Unless otherwise 
indicated, FAO data are used. 
 
Arable 
Base yield - the average of the middle three values for the period 1995-1999, national 
level only (there are insufficient data to permit estimates by region, nor to distinguish 
between small and large farms. 
Eligible area - the average of 1997-1999 data. 
Set aside (effective) assumed at 5%, assuming significant numbers of small farms. 
Insufficient structures data are available for an exact calculation of the effective set-
aside rate. 
 
Dairy 
Payment eligibility set with reference to 1999 quota levels. 
Payments are phased-in at the same rate as in the EU15 (for Bulgaria and Romania, 
starting in 2008). 
 
Beef 
The calculations are enormously difficult, given the lack of data on numbers of 
animals eligible for each payment. Data came from the FAO and the (slightly more 
disaggregated) EU Cronos database, coupled to discussion with specialists in DEFRA 
and a recognition of the low numbers of pure beef animals in the applicant states. Low 
eligibility rates are expected for the Suckler Cow Premium and Beef Special Premium 
(especially for steer payments). 
 
Sheep 
Headage limit - the highest value of the three years 1997-1999. 
LFA supplement eligibility set at 75% (roughly equal to EU15 shares and noting that 
sheep tend to be farmed in places with limited alternatives, thus national variations in 
LFA land are built-in to sheep numbers.) 
 9
Pos -Print
